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The written history of the Canadian railway sector focuses almost
exclusively on the financial problems associated with the construction
ofspecific railways.l Virtually no work on the growth ofthe Canadian
railway system has been undertaken either in terms ofits dimensions,
and how they changed over time, or on the efficiency of this sector.
This paper redresses part of this deficiency. It does so by setting out
the growth ofthe railway system in Canadafrom 1871 to 1926 in terms
ofthe net income generated by this industry. In addition, a preliminary
attemptis madeatestimatingproductivitychangefor therailway system.
The time period studied is from 1871 to 1926. These years span the
decades fromjust afterConfederation (1867) to approximately the peak
of economic activity in Canada during the interwar period. By 1926
the railway system, as we know it today was largely in place. This is
a far cry from the system which existed in the early 1870s. At that time
there were only 2,700 miles oftrack in operation and they were located
entirely in the Central (Ontario and Quebec) and Maritime (Prince
Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick) Provinces and only
in limited areas within these regions. The 55 years included here then
cover the growth ofthe system from its infancy to full maturity.
Alan G. Green is professor ofeconomics at Queen's University.
Although a number of people participated in the preparation ofthese estimates, two
deserve special mention. Leighton Reid estimated interest and dividend payments, and
PeterWylie worked on the real output and capital stock estimates. I pulled the scattered
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Railways provide the economic historian with a unique opportunity
to study long-term economic development. Given their size and ulti-
mate importance, governments sought information on them virtually
from the day they were introduced. It was obvious to contemporaries
that here was an innovation destined to touch, in some way, the lives
ofall citizens and hence the government needed to be informed about
this new "gadget." This interest was often translated into a special
effort to collect detailed data on the number ofmiles oftrack, revenue,
expenses, engines owned, etc. The sector, then, may well provide the
best window we have both on the development ofa particular industry
(how often do we get reasonably consistent annual data series that
extend back 113 years?) and on the economy as a whole.
The paper is divided into three parts. Section 15.1 sets out the pro-
cedures used to estimate net income originating in the railway industry.
These estimates were derived as partofa larger projecton reestimating
the Canadian National Accounts from 1871 to 1926 (reported on else-
where in this volume). As such the railway figures discussed in this
paper are only one segment ofthe income data devised for the Trans-
portation and Communications sector.2 Section 15.2 ofthe paper pre-
sents some analysis ofthe growth ofrailways in Canada overthe study
period, and in Section 15.3 a preliminary investigation is made ofpro-
ductivity change in this sector plus a look at factor share changes.
15.1 Estimating Procedures
The estimation procedure for railway net income is quite different
from that used in the commodity sectors-at least that adopted in the
reestimation ofthe Canadian national accounts. For the goods-producing
sectors much of the evidence on sectoral growth comes from the de-
cennial census. However, census reports do not contain information
on output for railways as they do for agriculture, manufacturing, and
so on. The only measure of railway size available from the census
reports is on labor input and, as we shall see, even this evidence is
suspect.
ForCanada, atleast, this omissiondid not presentan insurmountable
handicap to estimating railway output. From the beginning ofrailway
development in Canada all levels ofgovernment have been interested
in the progressofthis industryand have, consequently, setouttorecord
its development. Before 1867 (Confederation) such recording was car-
ried out by the various colonial governments. Unfortunately this was
not always done systematically. The newly formed Government of
Canada decided to centralize the procedure and, commencing in the
year ending June 30, 1875, required every railway operating in Canada
to report annually on its operations to the Department ofRailways and781 Growth and Productivity in the Canadian Railway Sector, 1871-1926
Canals underthe recentlypassedRailway StatisticsActof1875. Annual
collectionofrailway datahas continuedfrom then to the present. These
annual estimates were published by the Department of Railways and
Canals from 1875 to 1918 under the title "Railway Statistics" and
appear in the Sessional Papers ofCanada. Beginning in 1919 they were
published by the Dominion Bureau ofStatistics as "Railway Statistics
of Canada" annually from 1919 to 1921 and thereafter as "Statistics
ofSteam Railways ofCanada."3 More will be said on the coverage of
these annual reports in the discussion covering the actual estimation
of income for this sector. In addition to the official source, evidence
was drawn from Standard and Poor's and Moody's manuals on railways.
These annual publications provided the basic datafor the calculation
of net income originating in the railway sector. A factor-incomes ap-
proach was used. Thus net railway income is the sum of wages and
salaries, interest and dividend payments, and net savings. The latter is
estimated as a residual after dividend payments have been deducted
from net operating revenue. Each factor income component has its
own particular set ofproblems. Hence each will be discussed separately.
15.1.1 Wages and Salaries
Estimates of the total wage bill for railway employees were first
published in 1907 and have appeared annually ever since that date.
Unfortunately this series was not homogeneous over the period of
inquiry. In the early years the series included workers in railway ex-
press. It is possible to divide these two series from 1919 on, but not
for earlier years. Since such partitioning was not possible before this
date, the wage bill estimates are the sum ofthe two groups.
Besides these annual reports, information on wages paid to railway
workers was collected in the decennial census beginning in 1871. Un-
fortunately, the census estimates did not prove to be an entirely sat-
isfactory alternative source for this type ofinformation. The main rea-
son is that those who assigned the results from the census to various
components in the published reports saw the railway industry divided
into two distinctparts. One partwas composedofthose activities which
dealt exclusively with the provision of railway services, that is, the
movement of people and goods. The other part was associated with
manufacturing activity, the repair and rebuilding ofrailway equipment.
Another component, and one even harder to separate, consists ofun-
skilled workers who were partly engaged in track maintenance and
partly on new construction. For our purposes inclusion of the latter
would be inappropriate since they were notassociated with the delivery
ofrailway services in a given year.
The discrepancy is not small. If we take the censuses of 1911 and
1921, when annual estimates of total employment compensation are782 Alan G. Green
also available, the differences are as shown in table 15.1. There are
two points to note. First, the absolute difference betweenthe two series
can be large. Second, the size ofthe difference is not stable. By 1921
it had grown to $81 million. The greater spread between the two series
implies that as the system entered its slower expansion period more
employees were engaged in repairing and rebuilding rolling stock, rel-
ative to operating workers, than was the case in 1911. The census
estimates, for this reason (and for others to be discussed later), had to
be abandoned.
The failure ofthe "augmented" census reports to provide reasonable
estimates of the level of total wage payments forced us to find an
alternative method. What was required, then, was to discover a rea-
sonably constant relationship between an annual series that stretched
over these earlier years and the railway wage bill. After some exper-
imentation it was found that afairly stable relationship existed between
wages (the wage bill) and total operating expenses. For example, be-
tween 1907 and 1920 the ratio of wages and salaries to operating ex-
penses averaged 59.1%, with only a small dispersion around this mean.
To check the stability ofthis ratio total annual compensation paid to
United States railway employees was divided by total expenses for the
system. The period chosen was from 1895 to 1910. Over these years
the ratio averaged 61.0%, with only a small deviation about the mean.
Interestingly, the United States ratio was within 2 percentage points
ofthe Canadian ratio, and like the latter was trendless over the period
reviewed.
It was decided then, on the basis ofthe stability ofthe wage/expense
ratio, to extrapolate the wage bill for Canadian railways backfrom 1906
to 1875 on the basis ofthe total annual expenses record for the system,
with one modification. Total expenses 'were broken down into "Main-
tenance of Way and Structures" and "Other Operating Expenses."
The ratios ofwages paid differs sharply between these two broad cat-
egories ofexpenses. "Maintenance of Way and Structures" exhibit a
Table IS.l Railway Employees' Total Compensation, Census Estimates and














Col. 1: 1911, Census ofCanada; 1921, Census ofCanada.
Col. 2: Canada Year Book of1921 (Ottawa), p. 537.783 Growth and Productivity in the Canadian Railway Sector, 1871-1926
higher ratio due, one suspects, to the amount of track maintenance,
that is, replacing rails and ties, reballasting, snow removal, and so on,
all of which is labor-intensive work. This breakdown then permitted
us to incorporate, in the final estimates, any alterations between these
two broad categories which occurred in the course of building and
operating the railway system. Finally, estimates of total wages were
carried back to 1871 on the basis ofexpenses recorded for the Grand
Trunk Railway-the largest single railway operating in Canada at that
time. The results ofthese calculations appear in table. 15.2.
15.1.2 Interest and Dividend Payments
Estimating annual costs associated with the use ofcapital proved to
be a more difficult chore than was the procedure for obtaining a long-
term series on the wage bill for Canadian railways. In setting out the
procedures for estimating this component oftotal net income, the dis-
Table 15.2 Annual Estimates ofTotal Wages and Salaries Paid to Railway
Employees, 1871-1926 (Thousands of DoHars)
Year Amount Year Amount Year Amount
1871 7,190 1891 19,834 1911 77,520
1872 7,819 1892 20,639 1912 97,654
1873 8,538 1893 20,668 1913 119,771
1874 10,964 1894 19,851 1914 116,136
1875 8,987 1895 18,479 1915 94,159
1876 9,054 1896 19,718 1916 108,358
1877 8,669 1897 19,779 1917 135,009
1878 9,164 1898 22,058 1918 158,824
1879 9,259 1899 22,956 1919 240,377a
1880 9,573 1900 26,849 1920 299,875
1881 11,382 1901 28,617 1921 256,631
1882 12,673 1902 32,626 1922 240,428
1883 13,951 1903 38,436 1923 256,368
1884 14,471 1904 42,169 1924 241,359
1885 13,615 1905 45,450 1925 238,641
1886 13,725 1906 49,394 1926 254,689
1887 15,776 1907 58,719
1888 17,443 1908 60,377
1889 17,684 1909 63,217
1890 18,700 1910 67,168
Sources and methods:
1907-26: Canada Year Book, 1926.
1875-1906: "AnnualReportsofthe DepartmentofRailways andCanals," various reports
Sessional Papers ofCanada.
1874-71: Poor's Manual-annual reports ofexpenses for the Grand Trunk Railway.
See text for methods.
aBeginning with June 30, 1871, the estimates are for fiscal years until 1918. Beginning
in 1919 estimates are for calendar years ending December 31.784 Alan G. Green
cussion will be divided into two parts, since the method ofestimating
interest payments (Le., the bond or fixed-income portion) differs sub-
stantially from that used to calculate dividend payments.
Interest Income Payments
Interest payments by Canadian railways are available from 1919 to
1926 and are recorded annually in the Dominion Bureau of Statistics
publication, Railway Statistics of Canada from 1919 to 1921 and in
Statistics ofSteam Railways ofCanada: 1922 to 1926: indeed, up to
the present. Funded and floating debt payments from 1911 to 1915 can
be found in the "Annual Reports of the Department of Railways and
Canals," which appear in the Sessional Papers ofCanada. The only
problem with this series is that interest payments of the Canadian
Pacific Railway's 4% debenture stock were excluded until 1919. How-
ever, with the introduction ofthe new publication they were properly
recorded as part ofinterest payments. An adjustment for this omission
was made for these years.
Before 1911 the "Annual Reports" did not calculate total interest
payments (unlike the United States publications, which show total
interest and dividend payments back to at least 1890). However, on
very large spread sheets inserted in each "Annual Report" is shown
the amount outstandingofthe "Bonded" and "Floating" debtfor each
railroad in Canada, plus the coupon interest rate payable for the ma-
jority of these issues. This type of individual security information is
available annually from 1875 to 1911.
The solution to our problem of obtaining total interest payments,
then, seemed quite simple. We would multiply the outstanding security
value by its own coupon rate and total across all railways. To check
the validity of this approach, we calculated total interest payments
using this method for 1911-a year for which we had the official total.
Unfortunately the two estimates were verydifferent. Our "calculated"
total was much larger than the official estimate. In fact the difference
was close to $2.5 million. Onchecking eachofthe 72 railways included
in the estimation, we found that for many the difference between the
calculated method and the official figures was small, and quite often
the two estimates were identical. At least this was the case for the
small railways. The problem centered on the large railways, such as
the CPR and the Grand Trunk Railway. For example, for the CPR
calculated interest exceeded the official estimate by $5.3 million. The
excess ofcalculated over official for the Grand Trunk was about $2.0
million.
To eliminate this discrepancy, the estimation procedure was divided
into two parts. For the small railways we calculated individual annual
interest payments using the method described above. To this total we
added interest payments for the Canadian Pacific Railway, the Grand785 Growth and Productivity in the Canadian Railway Sector, 1871-1926
Trunk, the Canadian Northern, and the Canadian Northern Quebec
Railway. Estimates ofinterest payments for these larger railways are
recorded annually in Poor's ManualofRailroads back to the beginning
of operation of each. Poor's proved to be an invaluable source of
information on these larger Canadian railways. The manual recorded
operatingdatafor anyCanadianrailway which soughtto issue securities
in the United States, and did so annually from the middle ofthe nine-
teenth century. The information provided was quite extensive. It in-
cluded such statistics as operating revenue and expenses, interest and
dividend payments, capitalization by type ofsecurity, a history ofthe
organization ofeach railway, and so on.
A number ofthe smaller railways did not report the coupon rate for
their fixed interest securities. To solve this problem we calculated for
each year an average interest rate from the lines which did report
coupon rates. Table 15.3 sets out these average rates for each year
from 1875 to 1916 for bonded and floating debt. They are unweighted
Table 15.3 Average Interest Rates on Bonded and Floating Debt Paid by
Canadian RaDways, Annually, 1875-1916 (%)
Bonded Floating Bonded Floating
Year Debt Debt Year Debt Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1875 6.42 7.06 1896 5.27 5.93
1876 6.42 6.25 1897 5.20 5.37
1877 6.28 7.20 1898 5.27 4.01
1878 6.28 7.06 1899 5.14 5.54
1879 6.13 7.06 1900 5.16 4.81
1880 6.20 7.27 1901 5.12 4.90
1881 5.92 6.50 1902 5.13 4.49
1882 6.06 6.29 1903 5.07 3.62
1883 5.63 6.70 1904 5.00 3.87
1884 5.72 6.30 1905 5.02 4.04
1885 5.82 6.63 1906 n.a.a n.a.
1886 5.84 6.66 1907 4.95 4.04
1887 5.89 6.75 1908 4.98 4.04
1888 5.83 6.94 1909 4.95 4.04
1889 5.58 6.85 1910 4.94 4.04
1890 5.49 6.94 1911 4.86 4.04
1891 5.51 6.49 1912 4.91 4.04
1892 5.49 6.36 1913 4.92 4.04
1893 5.42 6.26 1914 4.85 4.04
1894 5.42 5.84 1915 4.89 n.a.
1895 5.40 5.74 1916 4.90 n.a.
Source: Department of Railways and Canals, "Annual Reports," Sessional Papers of
Canada, 1875-1916.
Note: Unweighted average ofreported coupon interest rates.
an.a. = not available.786 Alan G. Green
averages, and the number of observations varies from year to year,
hence the results in terms ofabsolute levels for anyone year must be
treated cautiously.
These nominal interestrates trace outaninteresting patternoverour
study period. They dropped sharply from 1875 to 1915. For bonded
debt the rates fell by 22% from 1875-80to 1910-15, thatis, from 6.29%
to4.90%. Thefull implicationofthis dropis seenifwe compare average
interest rates to price trends in general. Table 15.4 sets out these changes.
For the last third ofthe nineteenth century, according to these results,
real interest rates rose. The quality ofthese two data series precludes
any closer judgment on the trend in real interest rates, even though
the percentage changes suggest that prices fell slightly more slowly
than longer-term nominal interest rates. Real interest rates dropped,
however, in the opening years ofthe twentieth century, largely because
of a reversal in the trend ofprices. This changing pattern, as we will
see, conforms closely to the level ofrailway investmentoverthis period.
Columns 3 and 6 of table 15.3 show interest rates for floating debt,
representing the rate on short-term securities. Behavior of this series
parallels, over the whole period, the trend in bond debt; that is, the
nominal rate falls. However, for the last decades of the nineteenth
century the short-term rate is greater than the long-term rate, while
after 1900 the short-term rate is below the longer-term rate. Whether
these apparently divergent results are a product of the way interest
rate averages were obtained or whether they signal different market
prices for the two types of securities is a problem that will have to be
studied elsewhere.
Table 15.4 Index Numbers ofInterest Rates Paid by Canadian RaHways and
GNP ImpUdt Price Series, Selected Years 1875-1916
Annual Index for Years Shown of
Annual Interest Rates Annual Prices









Col. 2 See table 15.3.
Col. 3 M. C. Urquhart, "NewEstimatesofGross National Product, Canada, 1870-1926:
Some Implications for Canadian Development," in this volume, table 2.9.787 Growth and Productivity in the Canadian Railway Sector, 1871-1926
Total interest income payments for the railway sector are shown in
table 15.5. As in the case of wage payments, the interest income es-
timates were extrapolated to 1871 using the interest expense recorded
by the Grand Trunk Railway during these years.
Dividend Payments
Annual payments ofdividends to shareholders in Canadian railways
were not reported in the "Annual Reports" before 1911, as was the
casefortotal interestpayments. Thesourcesoftotaldividendpayments
are the same over the period 1911-26 as those set out in the previous
section.
Unfortunately, for the years before 1911 the "Annual Reports" did
not carry any information on dividend payments. However, in 1911 the
DepartmentofRailways and Canals reporteddividends paidby various
Canadian railways (table 15.6). The CPR and the GTR, according to
Table 15.5 Interest Payments Made by Canadian RaHways, Annually, 1871-
1926 (Thousands ofDoUars)
Year Amount Year Amount Year Amount
1871 3,123 1891 11,819 1911 21,581
1872 3,546 1892 12,724 1912 23,213
1873 3,684 1893 13,408 1913 25,073
1874 4,084 1894 14,620 1914 26,960
1875 4,004 1895 15,369 1915 27,765
1876 4,039 1896 15,603 1916 24,020
1877 4,129 1897 16,017 1917 43,795
1878 4,531 1898 15,968 1918 46,900
1879 4,254 1899 16,055 1919 54,6978
1880 4,364 1900 16,326 1920 59,270
1881 4,490 1901 16,661 1921 74,750b
1882 6,083 1902 16,910 1922 78,378b
1883 4,644 1903 16,917 1923 54,666
1884 5,005 1904 17,933 1924 59,448
1885 8,766 1905 19,161 1925 60,498
1886 8,838 1906 19,672 1926 59,241
1887 9,405 1907 20,007
1888 9,715 1908 20,969
1889 10,296 1909 22,012
1890 11,139 1910 23,095
aSee table 15.2, note a.
bThe sudden increase in interest rate payments in 1921 and 1922 apparently is related
to the amalgamation of several lines (Le., Grand Trunk, Canadian Northern, etc.) into
the government-owned railway, the Canadian National. In 1937, under the "Canadian
National Railway Capital Revision Act" interest payments were adjusted downward
beginningin 1923. Since these revised figures were the onesappearingin "SteamRailway
Statistics," we used them here. The figures (in thousands ofdollars) recorded annually
were 1923, 84,444; 1925, 91,002; 1924, 89,761; and 1926, 90,415.788 Alan G. Green
lilble 1S.6
Railway













Source: Annual Report ofthe Department ofRailways and Canals, Sessional Papers of
Canada (1912), 13:104.
8This figure does not agree with the dividend figure shown in table 15.7, since the one
intable 15.6includesthe4%ConsolidatedDebenturestockpaymentswhich,forpurposes
ofthe National Accounts, have been moved to "Interest Payments."
those records, accounted for approximately 98% ofthe total dividends
paid by all Canadian railways in this year.
To obtain dividend payments, then, only two railroads were used-
the CPR and the GTR. The sum ofdividends paid by these two com-
panies was divided by .98 to inflate this total to include the whole
system. Two problems were encountered with the GTR estimates.
First, over the period from 1875 to 1911, the GTR reported all of its
financial data in pounds sterling. The exchange rate used to convert
these figures to Canadian dollars was £1 = $4.86 ¥3-the rate set under
the terms ofthe Uniform Exchange Act, Statutes ofCanada, 1871. The
second problem is the way the GTR actually reportedorfailed to report
dividends. For the years from 1899 to 1903 the published records show
that no dividends were declared. However, a close check ofthe "sur-
plus" account shows that in fact they were paid. Hence dividend pay-
ments are included in our estimates for these years. Poor's Manual of
Railroads reocrds the dividend data. We also used the "Annual Re-
ports" ofthe CPR.
The results ofthese calculations are shown in table 15.7. A word is
necessary about this series since it moves around so much, especially
in the early years. We should expect greaterfluctuationsin a dividends
series than in an interest rate series since the ability, and willingness,
of a company to pay dividends depends on the profitability of the
company in a given year and that company's dividend policy. If the
decision has been made to pay dividends at about the same level each
year (Le., adding to or drawing down from surplus), then the payout
pattern would be much less volatile.
It is difficult to discern whether the CPR or the GTR had any such
policy. Certainly the GTR's payout was very volatile, as one can see
from the behavior ofthe series in 1883 and 1884. In 1883 the company,
after several years ofdeclaring low dividends, declared one ofalmost789 Growth and Productivity in the Canadian Railway Sector, 1871-1926
18ble 15.7 Dividends Declared by Canadian Rallways Annually, 1871-1926
(Thousands ofDoUan)
Year Amount Year Amount Year Amount
1871 100 1891 2,168 1911 24,989
1872 100 1892 2,200 1912 25,140
1873 100 1893 3,001 1913 27,333
1874 100 1894 1,920 1914 30,434
1875 100 1895 1,257 1915 32,341
1876 100 1896 2,231 1916 36,452
1877 100 1897 5,006 1917 30,145
1878 100 1898 4,944 1918 30,156
1879 100 1899 6,941 1919 30,157
1880 100 1900 6,954 1920 29,943
1881 100 1901 7,088 1921 30,157
1882 100 1902 7,516 1922 30,155
1883 2,985 1903 9,378 1923 30,356
1884 1,533 1904 9,318 1924 30,512
1885 100 1905 10,841 1925 30,410
1886 1,036 1906 12,198 1926 30,449
1887 1,872 1907 15,434
1888 906 1908 14,443
1889 2,101 1909 16,649
1890 2,612 1910 18,563
Sources and methods: See text.
aSee table 15.2.
$3.0 million. This dropped by halfthe next year, and by 1885 there was
only a token amount paid out. The largejump in 1883 and 1884 follows
the acquisition ofthe Grand Trunk Western by the GTR on August 11,
1882. However, more work will have to be done both onthe company's
annual reports to shareholders and on the detailed reports submitted
by the GTR to the Department ofRailways and Canals before we will
know why the Grand Trunk suddenly found that it could payout such
large amounts.
Another factor which needs to be examined is the way railways
charged new capitalitems. Railways in Canadadid not use depreciation
accounting on their capital stock. Rather, they "expensed" such items
as rail replacements, equipment renewals, and so on, against current
revenue. Hence if the company chose to add an office building, or
construct new bridges in one year, then this expenditure was charged
against current revenue. The result was that net operating revenue
(current receipts less current expenditures) dropped sharply and the
amount available to pay for dividends declined or disappeared. For
example, in 1898 the Grand Trunk built a new head office. The cost is
listed at $900,000. This amount was charged against revenue earned in
1898. Such decisions will obviously distort dividend payment patterns.790 Alan G. Green
15.2 Income and Investment, 1871-1926
The growth of the Canadian railway sector between 1871 and 1926
is set out in table 15.8. The estimates for income originating in this
sector and for railway and telegraph capital investment are in current
dollars.
Before we begin a discussion of this table, a word should be said
about the link between estimates oflabor and capital payments set out
in the previous section and the total income figures shown in table 15.8.
The latter is greater than the sum of wage and interest payments by
two broad items: savings, and otherfixed costs. Savings are defined as
the difference between net corporate income and dividends paid out.
Since information on net corporate income was not available before
1911, we used net operating revenue. This creates a slight upward bias
in the recorded savings figure. In addition to savings, such items as
taxes paid and income from renting equipment was included in the final
figure. The final result for net income originating in the railway sector
is shown in columns 1, 5, and 9 of table 15.8.
15.2.1 Income (Current Dollars)
During thefirst years ofourstudy, Canadianrailway income averaged
about $10 million a year. By 1926 this annual income flow had increased
to approximately $330 million. Even allowing for price changes, this
is an impressive growth record. An additional perspective on this growth
is provided in table 15.9, which sets out this expansion in terms of
miles of track in operation. Between 1871 and 1926 Canada added
51,584 miles ofrailway track to its inventory, with 36,000 miles ofthis
addition (or 70%) coming after 1900. The railway era for Canada is
clearly a twentieth-century event, unlike the United States where the
main building phase was over by the early 1890s.
The data show that within this 55-year span oftime there were three
periods of rapid expansion: 1871-76; 1880-84; and 1905-14. Each of
these periods is associated with a particular aspect of Canadian de-
velopment policy. At the time ofConfederation there were two railway
projects planned. One was to link the Maritime Provinces to Central
Canada, and the other was to join British Columbia via a Canadian
route to the rest ofCanada.
A railway linking the Maritimes to Central Canadawas begun in 1868
and completed in 1876. This line, known as the Intercolonial Railway
(ICR), started in Truro, Nova Scotia, and ran westward terminating in
Riviere du Loup. The Grand Trunk Railway ran eastward to this point.
Given that the ICR was built over a fairly roundabout route (to keep
it away from the United States border), private interests were unwilling




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.792 Alan G. Green
lilble 15.9 MBes of RaHway Track in Operation, Canada, 1871-1926
Year Miles Year Miles Year Miles
1871 2,695 1891 13,838 1911 32,559
1872 2,899 1892 14,564 1912 34,629
1873 3,613 1893 15,005 1913 38,223
1874 3,832 1894 15,627 1914 40,605
1875 4,331 1895 15,977 1915 45,833
1876 4,804 1896 16,270 1916 48,319
1877 5,218 1897 16,550 1917 50,253
1878 5,782 1898 16,870 1918 50,640
1879 6,226 1899 17,250 1919 50,691
1880 6,858 1900 17,657 1920 51,174
1881 7,194 1901 18,140 1921 51,747
1882 7,331 1902 18,714 1922 51,860
1883 8,697 1903 18,988 1923 51,936
1884 9,577 1904 19,431 1924 52,692
1885 10,273 1905 20,487 1925 54,100
1886 10,773 1906 21,353 1926 54,279
1887 11,793 1907 27,611
1888 12,184 1908 28,695
1889 12,585 1909 30,330
1890 13,151 1910 31,429
Source: Urquhart and Buckley (1968), ser. S28 and S77, pp. 528 and 532, respectively.
ence of this construction is seen in column 2 of table 15.8. Railway
investment rises sharply from $12.4 million a year in 1871 to $29.3
million in 1873, remaining in the $24.0 million range until the ICR is
completed in 1876. Note as well the sharp rise (col. 3) in the incremental
capitaVoutput ratio during these years ofconstruction. It appears that
excess capacity was being built into the Canadian railway system.
Traffic to support this expenditure came after the railway was built.
The same sequence was followed by the othergreat political railroad
ofthe period, the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR). After years ofne-
gotiations, and not without scandal, a line running westward across
the Prairies was startedin 1880 and completed in 1885. Unlike the ICR,
this was a privately built railroad but with substantial government sub-
sidies. The initial subsidy was to grant the builders $25 million in cash
and provide them with 25 million acres of land. The size of this un-
dertaking can be seen in column 2oftable 15.8. Gross investment rose
from an average of$7.9 million a year in 1877-79 to a peak in 1884 of
$72.5 million. Within a decade the volume of investment had soared
10-fold. This massive undertaking, as in the period ofthe construction
ofthe ICR, increased the investment/output ratio threefold-to levels
never experienced at any other time in our period. Again the CPR was
a railway built ahead ofdemand, although the sharp drop in this ratio793 Growth and Productivity in the Canadian Railway Sector, 1871-1926
toward the end of the 1880s and into the 1890s suggests that demand
was not long in coming. By the 1890s, then, Canada was linked from
the Pacific to the Atlantic by an all-Canadian railway route.
The third and final stage ofrapid railway extension spanned roughly
the first decade and a half of this century, peaking between 1905 and
the beginning ofWorld War I. These were the years ofwestern settle-
ment when the frontier pushed westward beyond Manitoba into Sas-
katchewanand Alberta(oftencalledthe''wheatboom" period). During
these years, in addition to extensive branch lines being built, two ad-
ditional transcontinental lines were constructed: the Canadian North-
ern, startedin 1903 and completedin 1915, andtheGrandTrunkPacific,
started in 1903, reaching completion at the outbreak ofWorld War I.
The opening decades of the twentieth century were years of mass
railroad building. As table 15.9 shows, the number ofmiles ofrailroad
in operation increased by 26,800 between 1903 and 1915, an amount
10 times greater than the size of the whole system in 1871. The in-
vestment data reflect this rapid expansion. As column 5 oftable 15.8
shows, the annual flow of gross fixed capital formation in railways,
having reached a low of $6.6 million in 1895, increased to an annual
level of$175.4 million in 1913 and averaged better than $120 million a
year from 1907 to 1915. One must question whether, at the start ofthis
railway investment boom, net investment was even positive. Between
1894 and 1895, for example, only 350 miles oftrack were brought into
operation (see table 15.9). Prior to the boom, then, expansion of the
railway system had virtually come to a halt. Expectations about eco-
nomic returns to be made in the Canadian west after 1895 obviously
proved to be a powerful magnet. CPR common stock, for example,
rose from $47.50 a share in 1895 to $153.50 (Innis 1971, p. 284), in
1905-a threefold increase!
One interesting difference between this period ofrailway expansion
and that which characterized the ICR and CPR periods is the lower
absolute ratio ofinvestment to income. Although the absolute change
was quite spectacular-from .20 in 1895 to 1.02 in 1908 (table 15.8)-
the "capping" at a level one-third of that observed in 1885 suggests
that traffic generatedby these new systems filled in very quickly behind
completionofthelines. Asteady stateofabout .30 was reachedmidway
through the First World War and this held until the mid-1920s. This
point will be studied more closely in the last section where real capital
stock estimates are discussed.
The pattern of income growth, as one might suspect, is somewhat
different from that ofinvestment. The reason for this is related to the
incentives for building these railways in the first place. In Canada, even
more than in the United States, the majority ofthese new lines were
really development railways, that is, railways sent into wilderness re-794 Alan G. Green
gions to open them for settlement. Transforming new land into pro-
ductive farms takes time. Land must be broken, and "land-breaking"
initial crops sown before crops for market can be planted. All of this
takes time, but in the end it is moving the cash crop to market which
generates traffic, and hence income growth in the railway sector.
One can see this lagged pattern quite clearly in table 15.8. Income
growth from 1873 to 1880 was relatively flat, but from the latter date
to 1886 it doubled. This increase was partly the reflection of better
times, butitmustalso be due tobusinesscreatedbythese newfacilities.
Even though the system was expanding slowly after 1885, nominal
income grew substantially, that is, from about $28.0 million in the late
1890s to $50.0 million by 1900. As we saw earlier (table 15.4) prices
actually fell during this period, so this gives a lower bound on nominal
expansion. Finally, in the "wheatboom" period (1900-1914), much of
the expansion in income occurred after the main phase of railway
building was completed, that is, during and after World War I.
15.2.2 Physical Output
To complement the previous series (table 15.8) on nominal income
growth in the railway sector, estimates of real output measured in
physical terms-ton miles and passenger miles-have been derived for
the period under review. These are shown in table 15.10. Official es-
timates of ton miles begin in 1907 and for passenger miles in 1910.
Hence for the years before these dates, physical output figures had to
be constructed from alternative data series.
The method used was that adopted by Fishlow (1966). This involves
dividing freight and passenger receipts by the average charge for these
services. Fortunately, receipts for the whole system are available back
to 1875. For the years 1871-74 the ton and passenger miles derived
for 1875 were extrapolated back on the trend oftotal expenses for the
Grand Trunk Railway.
The main problem with this procedure lies in choosing the appro-
priate average charges. Freight rates proved to be more difficult than
passengertariffs. The former vary substantially on the basis ofthe type
of good carried, that is, class of freight, and the distance goods are
transported. Generally the average freight rate falls as one moves from
higher-value but smaller items to lower-value, bulky goods. For ex-
ample, boots and shoes are included in Class 1, while flour and lumber
are included in the lowest class. Rates also varied by distance hauled,
among regions, and among trunk carriers. To obtain an average freight
rate we weighted the observed rates by regional mileage, the compo-
sition offreight carried, and freight shipped along the various trunks.
We were fortunate in getting a basic source of freight rates from a
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Relations (Ottawa, 1939), entitled "Railway Freight Rates in Canada"
(prepared by RAC Henry and Associates). In addition, the CPR "An-
nual Reports" carried details, annually, on average freight and passen-
gerrates. Passenger rates did not show the same variation as did freight
rates, although there were first-class and immigrant rates.
The final problem faced in calculating an average freight rate was to
determine the average haulage distance. After plotting rates per mile
against distance, it became clear that the average rate flattened out
after 125 miles. Hence our estimates, by class and type of carrier
(regional vs. national), were based on rates for 125 miles. Although by
1911 the averagefreight haul had increasedfrom earlieryears, it seemed
that for the whole period the 125-mile figure could be used without
seriously biasing the final results.
Finally, to combine these two series the weights used were the dis-
tribution oftotal earnings betweenfreight and passengerservice. These
weights (i.e., shares ofpassenger and freight revenue) were calculated
for each year from 1875 to 1926 and were used to obtain the total real
output shown in columns 3, 6, and 9 oftable 15.10.
The actual averages for freight and passenger rates are shown in the
Appendix. Although any given rate should be treated with caution, the
trends in passenger and freight charges per mile reflect, one suspects,
the basic changes in the system over these decades. It is worth noting
how rapidly average service charges for carrying freight dropped be-
tween 1875 and 1900 and again between the turn of the century and
World War I. The rise in freight rates after the end ofhostilities is an
interesting reversal in trend. As far as one can tell, it reflected the
awakening ofthe government to the fact that rates had notbeen allowed
to rise in line with labor and other input costs caused by war inflation
(more on this point later).
Ifwe take the trends in the physical output series (table 15.10) for
the total period, some interesting observations about the evolution of
the system emerge. First, the volume offreight traffic being handled
by the turn of the century was vastly greater than in 1871. This rein-
forces again the earlier contention that at the time of Confederation
Canadahad barely entered the railway era, butthatwith the completion
ofthe ICR (1876) and the CPR (1885), plus the building ofnew branch
lines, internal and external flows of goods (and people) were greatly
enhanced. Second, note that although passenger traffic grew substan-
tially (i.e., from 200 million to 741 million passenger miles from 1871
to 1900), freight volume growth was clearly the "leading" component,
growing from 269 million to 5,072 million ton miles over these three
decades. Ifwe relate these volume differences to receipts, with freight
rates falling relative to passenger rates, the distribution of earnings
between the two services remained fairly stable. For example, in 1875797 Growth and Productivity in the Canadian Railway Sector, 1871-1926
freight earnings accounted for 63% oftotal earnings, while in 1900 they
accounted for 67%.
Twentieth-century expansion, although not as spectacularin rate-of-
growth terms, nevertheless showed that we are dealing by the 1920s
with a mature railway system. At the beginning of World War I ton
miles offreight carriedhadincreasedfourfold from 1900, while between
1914 and 1926theincreasewas about50%. Henceoverthe whole period
there are three distinct phases ofgrowth. From the 1870s to the mid-
1890s the annual compound rate ofgrowth offreight traffic was about
10% per year. From 1900 to 1914, freight traffic grew at 11% per year,
while from 1914 to 1926 the rate dropped to 3.6%. Ifwe look back over
the history of the period, it is obvious that much of this growth was
associated with the geographic expansion ofthe system: the movement
into the west and the linking of the Central Provinces with the'Mari-
times. For the years from 1914 to 1926 this rapid geographic expansion
slowed, and so did total growth. In addition, road and canal transpor-
tation modes began to offer competition for freight business formerly
held almost exclusively by the railways.4
15.3 Productivity Change
The written history ofthe role ofrailways in Canadian development
is very different from that in the United States. Railways were central
to much ofthe American growth experience in the nineteenth century.
Schumpeter claimed that the economic history ofthe United States in
the last half of the nineteenth century might well be written solely in
terms ofthe railroad sector.5 Indeed, Fishlow and Fogel introduced to
economic history the concept ofsocial savings in connection with their
investigation into whether railroads were really as indispensable to
United States economic growth as suggested by earlier economic
historians.6
Railways in the context ofthis country's development did not fare
so well in the hands of earlier Canadian economic historians. Most
students read the history ofCanadian railways as a series ofscandals,
for example, that surrounding the building of the CPR, especially in
the final level ofsubsidy given to the contractors. Or the scandal which
arosein connectionwith the building ofthe Canadian NorthernRailway
and the suspect role of the line's promoters, Mackenzie and Mann.
Finally, the eventual takeover ofall railways, except the CPR, in 1919
was clear testimony to two basic features ofCanadian life. First, that
the country from time to time was prone to excessive speculation,
especially at the tumofthe century; that is, the illusion thatgood times
apparently always lead to better times. The main effect of this spec-
ulation during the wheat boom was the building oftwo new transcon-798 Alan G. Green
tinental railroads (in addition to the CPR) between 1903 and 1914. Again
speculativeinvestmentgotoutofcontrol, andthe systemwas overbuilt,
to the detriment ofthe economy.7 The second contention is that some
ofthese larger railways, like the Grand Trunk, experienced "irrespon-
sible management" and hence made significant construction (and op-
erations?) errors. This is hardly the stuffofwhich great myths are built.
In both countries recent research has modified such extreme posi-
tions.8 Nevertheless, for Canada at least, the simple exercise of ex-
amining the growth and efficiency of the railway system has not yet
been undertaken (Fishlow 1966). Before we can begin to study patterns
of performance, information on the growth of the principal inputs-
labor, capital, and fuel-must be acquired.
15.3.1 Growth of Labor Input
Data on the size of the railway labor force were first published in
1907, as in the case oftotal wages and salaries. Thus some method of
estimating the growth of this input between 1871 and 1907 had to be
found. Three possible approaches were available. One approach was
that used by Fishlow (1965, app. C). With this method, total employ-
ment ofrailway workers is divided by total operating revenue to obtain
an average relationship between these two magnitudes. Ifobservation
proves this to be a fairly stable relationship, then it can be used to
calculate employment for earlier years, since we have gross revenue
running back to 1871. Another method involves examining the rela-
tionship between employment and the number of miles of track in
operation. This approach links the growth of the labor force used in
the railroads to the growthofone ofthe principal piecesoffixed capital.
Given the nature oftechnological innovation in this industry during the
nineteenth century, estimates based on such a relationship probably
are notoutofline withwhatwas indeedhappening. Finally, the simplest
methodis to use decennial censusestimates ofthe numberofemployees
recorded for this industry.
There are two problems with using census estimates ofemployment
for the railway sector. First, as in the caseofwages and salaries referred
to earlier, census authorities chose to assign some railway workers
(such as those engaged in car repair and rebuilding) to the manufac-
turing sector rather than to the railway sector. Second, and more im-
portant, is the change in the method used to record workers in the
census before 1901. Beginning in 1901 information was collected both
onthe numberofgainfully occupied and on the numberofwage earners
attached to a particular industry. The latter total was collected from
the individual industries surveyed, while the former was collected as
part of the information obtained from individual households. For the
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obtained. The census takers were not interested in estimating the size
ofthe Canadian labor force but were more concerned with the general
socioeconomic characteristics ofthe population. As a result, where an
individual worked for a number ofemployers in the census year, he or
she was asked to name a main employer. This approach may have been
adequate for workers with some skill, but for laborers who worked
wherever they could find employment it meant listing them under the
title "Miscellaneous Unskilled Labour." Many individuals who worked
for the railroads fell into this category. For example, in a country like
Canada where clearing the tracks ofsnow was a bigjob, a large number
ofworkers who were actually on the payroll ofthe railway companies
were not assigned to this sector. It is impossible to sort out how many
of the unspecified laborers actually worked in this sector at anyone
census date. Indeed it is even impossible to estimate the trend. Since
this was undoubtedly a large component, the census records could not
be used even when the workers engaged in manufacturing activity were
added to the base number ofthose listed as gainfully occupied workers
in "Steam Railways."
With some doubt about whether the census approach would render
the growth of labor input accurately, we were left with the Fishlow
method and the ratio of workers to miles of track in operation. The
Fishlow approach was tried,9 but unfortunately for our case it gave
misleading results. The problem which emerged was with the influence
ofprice changes on the ratio during the turbulent years 1907- 26. This
period covered the last years of frontier settlement, the First World
War, the inflation that accompanied it, and finally the postwar adjust-
ment, not only to the economy, but also to the railroad sector which,
with the exception ofthe CPR, was taken over by the government and
amalgamated to form the Canadian National Railway system. These
were not good years in which to establish a ratio of revenue to em-
ployment that could be used to project labor growth back from 1907
to 1871.
The method adopted, then, was to divide employment in the railroad
sector by track mileage in operation. One possible benefit of this ap-
proach was that it put in the ratio two real factors, rather than mixing
real (employment) with nominal elements (revenue). Further, the ratio
ofemployment to track mileage proved to be a remarkably stable ratio
over the years for which we had evidence on both figures, that is, after
1907. The ratio averaged about four employees per mile of track op-
erated. The only deviation from this average occurred during periods
ofextensive railroad construction, when it rose to about 5.5 employees
per mile of track. This is what one would expect, since the railroads
would take on extra help during the startup of new lines. Accommo-
dation for this variation was made by incorporating the higher ratio in800 Alan G. Green
our calculation oflabor input during known periods ofrailroad expan-
sion (e.g. during the building of the CPR). The results are shown in
table 15.11.
15.3.2 Growth in Real Capital Stock
Estimates ofreal capital stock were never collected by the govern-
ment. The only data available are on the book value ofvarious railroad
lines, investment figures, and the physical stock ofcertain assets. This
is not a unique problem. Fishlow (1966) faced the same difficulty.
The method used to estimate real net capital stock for the Canadian
railroad sector differs from that used by Fishlow. Here we adopted the
"perpetual inventory" method. The "perpetual inventory" approach
requires three basic pieces of information: current dollar gross fixed
capital formation estimates, capital goods price indices, and data on
the "average economic life" ofcapital goods. The sources ofeach of
these series are set out below.
Capital Formation Series
We are fortunate to have two extant series on gross capital formation
for the railroad industry. One series was completed in 1962 by Ken
Buckley (1962); the other, by Statistics Canada (1978), as basic input
'DIble 15.11 Employment in the Canadian RaDway Sector, AnnuaUy, 1875-1926
(1bousands)
Year Employment Year Employment Year Employment
1875 21.62 1893 67.52 1911 141.22
1876 23.48 1894 62.51 1912 155.90
1877 26.02 1895 63.91 1913 178.65
1878 28.02 1896 65.08 1914 159.14
1879 30.86 1897 66.20 1915 124.14
1880 32.32 1898 67.48 1916 144.77
1881 36.66 1899 69.00 1917 146.18
1882 52.18 1900 75.04 1918 143.49
1883 58.06 1901 81.63 1919 158.78
1884 51.37 1902 93.57 1920 185.18
1885 48.48 1903 94.94 1921 167.63
1886 53.96 1904 102.01 1922 165.64
1887 60.92 1905 112.68 1923 178.05
1888 60.82 1906 117.44 1924 169.97
1889 63.14 1907 124.01 1925 166.03
1890 65.76 1908 106.44 1926 174.27
1891 69.19 1909 125.11
1892 72.84 1910 123.77
Sources andmethods: See text; 1875-1918: "Railway Statistics," Annual Reports ofthe
Department ofRailway and Canals in the Sessional Papers ofCanada until 1918; 1919-
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to its publication Fixed Capital Flows and Stocks. Both series are
carefully constructed, and both are defined as covering railroad trans-
port, including telegraph and cable systems. This study uses both se-
ries-Buckley for the earlier years, and the Statistics Canada figures
for the more recent period. Buckley's estimates have the added ad-
vantage ofbeginning in 1850. Statistics Canada's figures start in 1871.
Price Indices
The availability of the Statistics Canada series entitled, "Price In-
dices for Capital Expenditure" allowed us to obtain real capital for-
mation estimates back to 1871. These indices cover building and en-
gineering construction as well as prices for machinery and equipment.
To pushthe seriesbackto 1850, a price indexof"Ironand ItsProducts"
and a "General Wholesale Price Index" were used."lo
Average Economic Life
The ground rules on determining "averageeconomic life" ofrailroad
assets are very shaky. It was decided, therefore, that the service life
estimates used by Hood and Scott (1957) were probably the most suit-
able. They estimated an average service life for all structures (not just
railroad structures) at 50 years and for all equipment at 28 years. Ulmer
(1960) found tht railroad structures accounted for 74% of total fixed
reproducible assets in this industry, while machinery and equipment
accounted for the other26%. Hence average service life was calculated
as follows:
50 (.74) + 28 (.26) = 45 years.
Straight-line depreciation was assumed over the 45-year average ser-
vice life of structures and equipment. The final estimates of net real
capital stock are shown in table 15.12.
Unfortunately there are not extant alternative series against which
to check our results. As a partial substitute, data were collected on the
growth ofphysical stock in the Canadian railroad sector from 1870 to
1930. To test whether the real net capital stock provides a fair repre-
sentation of the growth of this input, annual growth rates for several
series (such as miles of rail in operation, number of engines in use,
etc.) were collected to provide a rough comparison against which to
judge our new estimates. These comparisons are shown in table 15.13.
The unweighted growth rates ofvarious physical assets shown in col-
umn 5 exhibit a very lose relationship to the growth ofour estimates
ofreal netcapital stock. This is atleastencouraging. During the critical
period of railroad expansion, 1900-1915, 5-year average growth esti-
mates were calculated (table 15.13, panel B). Again the correspondence
is reasonably close and leads one to believe that the "perpetual in-802 Alan G. Green




Year Stock Year Stock Year Stock
1875 141.4 1892 448.3 1909 1,005.7
1876 154.9 1893 453.6 1910 1,133.2
1877 166.4 1894 454.4 1911 1,279.6
1878 176.3 1895 450.8 1912 1,466.7
1879 185.3 1896 450.1 1913 1,664.2
1880 191.6 1897 451.2 1914 1,792.0
1881 201.5 1898 465.7 1915 1,855.1
1882 230.6 1899 471.7 1916 1,837.3
1883 267.2 1900 478.7 1917 1,818.7
1884 309.1 1901 488.7 1918 1,801.8
1885 342.7 1902 500.6 1919 1,789.4
1886 363.2 1903 528.1 1920 1,779.8
1887 378.8 1904 560.6 1921 1,776.6
1888 393.8 1905 608.1 1922 1,740.3
1889 415.1 1906 670.1 1923 1,740.6
1890 431.0 1907 789.4 1924 1,729.8
1891 444.8 1908 901.3 1925 1,696.3
Sources and methods: See text.
18ble 15.13 Annual Growtb Rates of RaUs, Engines, Passenger, and Freight
Can and in tbe Index of Real Net Capital Stock (%)
Unweighted Index of
Average Net Capital
Passenger Freight Cols. Stock
Rails Engines Cars Cars 1-4 (1910 = 1(0)
Years (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A
1875-1900 5.38 3.43 4.25 4.76 4.5 5.00
1900-1910 5.84 5.98 18.90 6.94 9.4 8.77
1910-20 5.00 3.99 4.26 6.53 4.9 4.62
1920-30 1.01 -1.00 -1.14 -0.35 1.50
Panel B
1900-1905 2.94 4.95 0.40 5.79 3.5 4.90
1905-10 8.82 7.02 14.34 8.09 9.6 13.26
1910-15 7.84 6.10 7.93 11.24 8.3 10.14
Source: Cols. 1-4: Urquhart and Buckley (1968), pp. 528-32. col. 6: see table 15.12.
ventory" method (using the two series on capital formation) provides
agoodapproximationtothelong-termgrowthofrailroadnetrealcapital
stock. Note that the rapid growth in passenger cars from 1905 to 1910
was followed in the next quinquennium by a a rapid growth in freight
cars. The passenger car spurt was in response to accelerated immigra-803 Growth and Productivity in the Canadian Railway Sector, 1871-1926
tion, while the freight cargrowth was in response to additions to output
created by the influx ofnew settlers.
15.3.3 Growth of Fuel
Since the conversion offuel into mechanical power is central to the
operation of railroads, it was treated as a separate input. Table 15.14
sets out the number ofBTUs consumed. Again from 1907 to 1926, the
"AnnualReports" record tons offuel consumed, in coaland coalequiv-
alents. For the years prior to 1907 the only record of fuel consumed
was that reported by the Intercolonial Railroad, a government railroad
that reported separately on its annual operations. The Intercolonial
listed fuel used annually over the full period plus the number ofengine
miles run by its locomotives during a given year. The numberofengine
miles run was also available for the entire railway system. Thus the
tonnage used on the Intercolonial was scaled up to give a figure for the
entire system, using the ratio ofengine miles for the system to engine
miles run on the Intercolonial. This ratio was remarkably stable, at
about 10:1 over the period before 1907.
To compare Canada's consumption offuel with the United States, I
derived the figures shown in the unnumbered table below. These show
pounds ofcoal and coal equivalents consumed per locomotive mile.
18ble 15.14 Fuel Consumed in the Canadian Railroad Sedor, AnnuaUy, 1875-
1926 (MUlions of BTUs)
Year Fuel Year Fuel Year Fuel
1875 5.7 1892 20.7 1909 78.9
1876 6.1 1893 21.0 1910 72.2
1877 6.3 1894 21.0 1911 78.5
1878 6.8 1895 18.9 1912 89.9
1879 7.2 1896 20.4 1913 106.9
1880 7.3 1897 19.2 1914 98.7
1881 9.7 1898 20.8 1915 79.7
1882 9.6 1899 24.3 1916 103.8
1883 14.2 1900 26.3 1917 116.9
1884 11.1 1901 27.1 1918 117.4
1885 12.2 1902 29.9 1919 111.8
1886 12.3 1903 34.9 1920 124.0
1887 15.3 1904 39.1 1921 103.8
1888 15.3 1905 42.6 1922 106.9
1889 15.8 1906 47.7 1923 117.9
1890 17.2 1907 64.7 1924 107.5
1891 21.7 1908 68.9 1925 105.4
1926 111.3
Sources and methods.~See text.804 Alan G. Green
Uoited States
Canada (Fishlow)
1880 62 1880 65
1890 80 1890 80
1900 76 1900 100
1907 125
1910 132 1910 150
1920 152
These figures support our estimation technique, since they indicate
that both countries were experiencing about the same trend in fuel
consumed per locomotive mile. Increased consumption is mainly due
to the shift to heavier engines over time.
15.3.4 Measures ofPartial and Total Factor Productivity
Two measures ofproductivity change are used in assessing the per-
formance of the railroad sector, partial and total factor productivity.
These are shown in panel B oftable 15.15. The ratios are derived from
the indices on output and input recorded in panel A. A weighted sum
of inputs is shown in line 5. The weights used for the labor, capital,
and fuel are .55, .35, and .10, respectively. Fishlow used these shares
lilble 15.15 IDdex ofTotal Output, Inputs, Partial and Total Fador
Productivity for the Canadian Rallroad Sedor, 1875-1920
(1910 =100.00)
1875 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Total Output and Inputs
1. Real output (0) 3.59 5.33 14.80 33.29 100.00 185.90
2. Labor (L) 17.48 26.15 53.14 60.62 100.00 125.37
3. Capital (K) 12.47 16.91 38.03 42.24 100.00 163.22
4. Fuel (F) 7.89 10.11 23.82 36.43 100.00 171.75
5. Total inputs 14.35 20.41 43.62 50.77 100.00 140.00
B. Partial and Total Factor Productivity
6. OIL 20.56 20.40 27.85 54.91 100.00 148.28
7.0/K 28.80 31.55 38.91 78.81 100.00 118.36
8.01M 45.52 52.76 62.12 91.38 100.00 108.24
9. TFP 25.05 26.13 33.92 65.57 100.00 132.79
Sources: See tables 15.10, 15.11, 15.12, and 15.14.
Note:
Line 5: Weights for labor, capital, and fuel are .55, .35, and .10, respectively.
Line 6: Line 1 divided by line 2.
Line 7: Line 1 divided by line 3.
Line 8: Line 1 divided by line 4.
Line 9: Line 1 divided by line 5.
aTFP = total factor productivity.80S Growth and Productivity in the Canadian Railway Sector, 1871-1926
in his study ofUnited States railroads (1966, p. 626). A check on factor
share costs for Canadian railroads in 1910, the same year used by
Fishlow to obtain his shares, reveals an almost identical share distri-
bution and since the cost share data appear more complete for the
American case, the United States ratios were adopted.
Partial Productivity
Per worker productivity (line 6) shows the most rapid advance ofthe
three ratios. Its compound annual growth from 1875 to 1920 was 4.5%,
while for capital the compound annual growth rate was 3.2%, and for
fuel, the poorest performer, it was 1.9%. This rapid growth in labor
productivitywas notunrelated to thegrowthofcapital, which'exceeded
the growth oflabor; that is, 5.9 vs. 4.5, respectively. With a rise in the
K/L ratio, it is not surprising that labor productivity performed as it
did over this period.
This advance in labor productivity, however, was not even. In the
decades preceding the opening of the West (i.e., 1875-1900), labor
productivity advanced at the annual rate of4.0%, while for the frontier
period it grew at 5.1%, or a full 25% faster. The reasons this occurred
are complex, but differential rates of growth of labor and capital be-
tween the two periods tell part of the story. Between 1875 and 1900,
labor grew at 5.1% and capital growth was virtually identical. After
1900 the rates diverged sharply. Labor growth slowed to 3.7% while
capital growth grew at 7.0%, or almost double that oflabor. It is little
wonder that capital productivity fell behind that oflabor after the turn
ofthe century. The geographic expansion ofthe system after 1900 not
only brought massive changes to the size of the system but clearly
changed the relationship between capital and labor, raising the capital/
labor ratio sharply.
Railroad building is a capital intensive and expensive activity. One
would be surprised, then, if excess capacity were not built into the
system initially. The Canadian system apparently is no exception to
this rule, especially before 1800. The capital/output ratio (real capital
stock divided by real output was about 14.1 in 1875 (compared to a
United States ratio of 10.3). By 1900 the ratio had fallen to 5.2, and it
continued to fall as we entered the twentieth century. Although we
cannot say by how much, part ofthe observed growth in worker pro-
ductivity must have come from these sharply increased capital utili-
zation rates. These observations reenforce the points made early in the
discussion on investment/output ratios.
Total Factor Productivity
The measure oftotal factor productivity shown in line 9 oftable 15.15
was derived by dividing the real output index by an index ofweighted
inputs (capital, labor, and fuel). It is simply the difference between the806 Alan G. Green
growth ofoutput and weighted inputs. This residual measures the con-
tribution ofthe growth in output notaccountedfor by measured inputs.
It captures the influence oftechnological change, economies of scale,
organizationofbusiness, and the effectofhuman capitalimprovements
on productivity. The measure of total factor productivity shown here
should be taken only as a first approximation. I hope that otherwriters
will refine the estimate.
Between 1875 and 1920 totalfactor productivity, as measured in table
15.15, grew atan annual rate of5.8%. The annual rate varied very little
between our two periods, that is, 3.9% before 1900 and 3.6% between
1900 and 1920. In terms ofthe contribution oftotal factor productivity
to total growth in real output, the story is quite different. Between 1875
and 1900 the residual accounted for 56% of output growth, while for
the decades after 1900 it accounted for only 42%. This result is quite
different from that for the economy as a whole. In calculating TFP for
the Canadian economy, Lithwick (1967, p. 53) found that it grew at
0.75% a year between 1891 and 1910, rising to 1.2% between 1910 and
1926. The residual's contribution to the growth ofnational output was
only 22% in the first period, rising to 47% in the second. Apparently
technological change was playing a larger role in the total growth of
the railroad sector than it was for the economy as a whole.
Fishlow (1966) also found that growth ofTFP was high in the United
States railroad sector over his period of study. In examining several
factors which might have increased the quality ofthe capitalinput(such
as the introduction ofair brakes, the adoption ofautomatic couplers,
the effects ofbuilding ona largerscale, andgreaterutilization), Fishlow
(1966) came to the conclusion that the most important factor was ap-
parently the substitution of steel for iron rails. Steel rails meant the
railroads could run larger and heavier trains, hence saving on capital
and labor inputs.
We have little information at this stage ofour inquiry on the rate of
adoption of such items as air brakes, automatic couplers, and so on,
but information is available on the rate ofadoption, in Canada, ofsteel
rails. The ratios in table 15.16 indicate that Canada was ahead in the
adoption ofsteel rails from 1875 to 1890. The rate ofadoption is really
quite amazing, given that the first large-scale adoption ofsteel rails was
on the Pennsylvania Railroad system in the early 1860s. Within 2 de-
cades, then, halfofall rails used in Canada were steel. The use ofsteel
rails, it is to be remembered, only provides an opportunity to use
heavier equipment. It will be interesting to see whether Canadian com-
panies actually exploited this potential advantage. The observation of
an earlieradoptionofsteelrails is given onlyas a placetobegin studying
the factors which led to the high productivity gains in this sector be-
tween 1875 and the early 1920s.807 Growth and Productivity in the Canadian Railway Sector, 1871-1926
















8Historical Statistics ofCanada, p. 528.
bFishlow (1966), p. 635.
Table 15.17 Productivity Comparisons for Canadian and American Railroads
1880-1910
OIL O/K OfF TFP
Year (1) (2) (3) (4)
1880 80.5 107.8 135.7 95.2
1890 54.8 72.5 111.1 66.2
1900 54.6 63.7 103.7 62.1
1910 94.1 63.3 140.9 87.0
Sources and methods: The ratios were determined using the following relationships:
SL SK SF
A2
IA. = Q21L2 Q21K2 Q2/F2
Q./L. Q2/K. Q./F.
where subscript 2 stands for Canada and 1 stands for the United States. The factor
shares SL, SK, and SF are an average ofthese values for the year 1910. (see Allen, 1979,
p. 916.) U.S., A. Fishlow (1966).
15.3.5 Productivity Change in Canada and the United States
Since the measurement techniques used by Fishlow (1966) and by
me in estimating productivity change (partial and total) are very similar,
it seemed reasonable to compare the relative performance of the two
systems where we had estimatesfor bothcountries. These comparisons
are shown table 15.17. It should be emphasized thatwe are only looking
at productivity relatives at a particular date rather than as a trend, as
in the case ofproductivity changes in the Canadian system discussed
in connection with the results shown in table 15.16.
One does not want to make too much of these estimates, but as a
preliminary glimpse ofthe relative performance ofthe two systems the
effort seems worthwhile. The ratios suggest, but do not prove, that
Canada's railroad system was relatively less efficient at the beginning
of our study than was the United States system, and it fell slightly
behind the latter during the balance of the nineteenth century. Ac-
cording to the estimates, this conditionreverseditselfin the first decade
ofthis century. Was this due to the fact that the Canadian system was808 Alan G. Green
in the process of working off excess capacity, or was it due to other
factors, such as added costs in running a northern railway system?
These are obviously points that need to be investigated further.
Finally, thelong-runevidenceonproductivitygrowthin theCanadian
railroad sector gives us some perspective on the discussion earlier
concerning the supposed overbuilding and ultimately the inefficiency
which apparently plagued Canadian railroads after the completion of
the third transcontinental railway. The reasongiven for the government
takeover was that the supply of railroad services exceeded demand,
forcing down returns and creating the potential for bankruptcy and
major dislocations in the Canadian economy. The government was
forced to step in and save the system from the overzealous railroad
entrepreneurs. Was this really the case? The evidence seems to suggest
that the answer is no.
First, there is no question that the some railroads' ability to pay fixed
debt charges deteriorated sharply between 1913 and 1920. From 1912
to 1914 net operating revenue (out ofwhich is paid all charges on fixed
and floating debt, taxes, and equipment rentals) was averaging about
$70 million a a year. By 1918 and 1919 net operating revenue was
averaging $49 million. In current dollar cash flow terms, the fear of
failure was not unfounded. However, this evidence on cash shortage
was translated by earlier writers into overbuilding. The evidence we
have seen implies that this is suspect. By the middle of World War I
farm output from the Prairies-which had been the goal of railroad
building from the beginning-hadfinally come on stream. Forexample,
by 1918 the ratio ofexports to GNP had climbed to 35.3%, more than
double what they had been only 6 years earlier, in 1910. 11 The ratio
remained at about 25% or greater until the end ofour period. Most of
these exports were bulky goods, grain, war materiel, and so on, vir-
tually all ofwhich moved by rail. As table 15.10, column 7 shows, ton
miles carried, which had been running at roughly 15.7 billion in 1910,
doubled by 1916 to 31.2 billion and remained around the latter level
into the mid-1920s. Real output growth continued to expand at a rapid
rate, at least until the end ofthe First World War.
Did real output grow more slowly than inputs? Regardless of the
ratios used (panel B, table 15.15), none exhibit a downward trend, and
we have used 1920 as the terminal year-the year that the takeover
was under way. Apparently we must cast our net wider for an expla-
nation ofthe failure ofthe system (with the exception ofthe CPR) to
remain in private hands. The argument concerning inefficiency based
on excess capacity has been substantially weakened with our new
estimates. Astartingplacefor arevision mightbewiththe way railroads
were regulated during this period. Briefly, the government regulated
freight and passenger rates and held them constant during the course809 Growth and Productivity in the Canadian Railway Sector, 1871-1926
of the war. However, beginning around 1917 prices of all goods rose
sharply, including wages. For railroads builtjust prior to the outbreak
of hostilities the cost burden was high, since, among other reasons,
they financed construction by borrowing rather than financing through
equity. With high fixed costs and rising variable costs, but fixed tariffs,
profits fell and the capacity of the railroads to meet debt obligations
diminished. Ultimately, bankruptcy would have occurred, in the ab-
sence of either a change in rate regulations or, as did happen, the
government's taking over railroad obligations and nationalizing the
system (again with the exception of the CPR). The role of regulation
in the operation of the railroads needs to be investigated more thor-
oughly before we know the full reasons for the nationalization of the
system.
15.3.6 Long-Term Change in Labor's Factor Share
The way income in the railroad sector was estimated allows us to
calculate the cost shares ofcapital and labor. Note that labor's factor
sharediffers slightlyfrom thatusedtoestimatetotalfactorproductivity.
Here the share is derived from an income approach, whereas in the
earlier case an input cost-share method was adopted. The latter, for
example, included a direct measure of fuel costs. Since our primary
concern here is with trends, this difference should not affect the dis-
cussion. Labor's share has been estimated on a 5-year period basis
from 1875 to 1924. The results are shown in table 15.18. Before dis-
cussing the results, a word needs to be said about the sudden rise in
labor's share during the last period (1920-24). Mter the end ofWorld
War I, as discussed earlier, Canadian railroads ran into financial diffi-
culty. The result was that the sector dissaved for much of the period
from 1920 to 1924. The negative savings reduced the final estimate of
income and hence pushed up the ratio ofwages to income.
Table 15.18 Labor's Factor Share, Avenge for Quinquennial Periods, 1875-





























Sources: Income originating, table 15.8; total wages and salaries, table 15.2
aIf income originating in the railway sector is measured excluding saving (see text), this
ratio becomes 0.73.810 Alan G. Green
The ratios shown in table 15.18 suggest that the trend in labor's share
was quite different between the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries.
Duringtheformer, the sharefell steadily, while duringthefirst 3decades
of the century it rose. This type of break can be observed on an ag-
gregate basis for the United States. Moses Abramovitz and Paul David
(1973, table 2) show labor's share dropping steadily from 1800 to 1900
and then rising between 1900 and 1969.
The neoclassical explanation is that the bias of technical change
tendedtofavor capitalfrom 1875 to 1900(takingintoaccountthe supply
of investment funds and the elasticity of substitution). On the other
hand, during the twentieth century the reverse is suggested. If, then,
we assume, as is usually the case, that the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor is less than one and the capitaVoutput ratio
rises sharply (as was probably the case during part ofthe period), one
might expect to find labor's share rising. Unfortunately, as we saw in
table 15.8, the incremental capitaVoutput ratio fell during the last de-
cade ofour period. It is obvious that we need to supplement the neo-
classical explanation with an alternative hypothesis.
One suggested alternative would be a market-powerapproach. 12 The
argument here is that as railroad unions became more powerful they
increased labor's share oftotal income, that is, the railroad companies
lost some oftheir monopsony power in the labor market. In this type
of explanation it is necessary as well to understand conditions in the
productmarket. If, as we suggested earlier, service rates onthe railroad
were regulated and could not be increased to offset the rise in wage
rates, then labor's share would increase.
The neoclassical and market-power approaches are presented here
more as interesting alternatives than as definitive explanations, al-
though the fact that both may play a role either sequentially or simul-
taneously seems to be a line worth exploring. One benefit of a long-
term approach in studying the phenomenon of sectoral or national
growth is that it allows us to escape the strictures ofbelieving that a
single approach will suffice in what is inherently a complex process.811 Growth and Productivity in the Canadian Railway Sector, 1871-1926
Appendix
18ble IS.A.l Average Freight and Passenger Rates per Mile, Canadian Railways,
AnnuaUy, 1875-1926 (Cents per Mile)
Pass- Pass- Pass-
enger Freight enger Freight enger Freight
Year Rate Rate Year Rate Rate Year Rate Rate
1875 2.50 3.50 1891 2.45 1.40 1907 1.91 0.81
1876 2.46 3.40 1892 2.45 1.30 1908 1.92 0.72
1877 2.50 3.20 1893 2.40 1.20 1909 1.92 0.73
1878 2.50 3.00 1894 2.40 1.10 1910 1.87 0.74
1879 2.50 2.80 1895 2.35 1.00 1911 1.94 0.78
1880 2.50 2.60 1896 2.30 1.00 1912 1.94 0.76
1881 2.50 2.40 1897 2.25 0.95 1913 1.97 0.76
1882 2.50 2.30 1898 2.20 0.95 1914 2.01 0.74
1883 2.50 2.20 1899 2.15 0.95 1915 2.02 0.75
1884 2.50 2.10 1900 2.10 0.90 1916 1.95 0.65
1885 2.50 2.00 1901 2.05 0.90 1917 1.95 0.65
1886 2.50 1.90 1902 2.00 0.90 1918 2.12 0.74
1887 2.50 1.80 1903 1.95 0.90 1919 2.59 0.98
1888 2.50 1.70 1904 1.90 0.85 1920 2.94 1.07
1889 2.50 1.60 1905 1.90 0.85 1921 3.04 1.20





Sources and methods: 1875-1910, see text; 1911-26, "Railway Statistics," Department
ofRailways, and Canals; after 1919, Dominion Bureau of Statistics.
Notes
1. The interested reader is referred to such standard texts as Easterbrook and Aitken
(1956); Marr and Paterson (1980), chap. 10; and Pomfret (1981), pp. 99-107.
2. Similar estimates to those for the railway industry were made for the electric
railways, water transport, road transport, telephone, and telegraph industries.
3. A complete description ofthe sources and assessment ofrailway statistics can be
found in Urquhart and Buckley (1965), pp. 516 fT.
4. For a parallel growth pattern, although starting earlier, see Fishlow (1966), p. 628.
5. Quoted by Fishlow (1966), p. 583.
6. Fishlow (1965), esp. chap. 2, and Fogel (1964), chaps. 1-3.
7. For a discussion ofthis point, see Plumptre (1937).
8. For a review of whether the CPR did or did not receive excessive government
subsidies, see George (1968).
9. For a full discussion on the application of the Fishlow method to the Canadian
case, see A. Green (mimeographed).
10. Urquhart and Buckley (1965), sere 40 and 165, p. 305.
11. See M. C. Urquhart's piece in this volume.812 Alan G. Green
12. For a discussion ofmarket power in explaining factor share trends, see Matthews
et ale (1982), pp. 194-97.
Comment Albert Fishlow
There are threedimensions to the researchreported here byAlan Green
on the evolution ofthe Canadian railway sectorfrom 1871 to 1926. The
first is an estimate of annual income originating as a component of
M. C. Urquhart's estimates of national income reported elsewhere in
this volume. The second is determination oftrend rates ofincrease in
factor productivity overthe same period. Last, but not least, is the use
ofthese quantitative results to reassess generalizations about the per-
formance ofthe Canadian railway sectorin the early twentieth century.
As is evident, this is an ambitious paper that a brief comment cannot
do full justice. I shall be able to touch only lightly on these three
subjects.
The principal tasks in estimating income originating are to calculate
wages and salaries before 1907 and interest and dividends before 1911.
Green is able to exploit the availability of relatively accurate annual
data on railway operating expenses to ascertain the wage and salary
totals. For interest and dividends he takes advantage of the concen-
tration ofthe Canadian railway system to focus on large units like the
Canadian Pacific and Grand Trunk, for which Poor's Manual provides
detailed financial information.
His proceduresarereasonable. Theresultsforinterestanddividends,
in particular, are likely to be quite accurate. Residual profits are then
obtained from the annual series on operating revenue. They are sen-
sitive to variability in fixed charges and dividend policy; in particular,
the decision ofthe Canadiangovernment to change accounting practice
in 1923 for the components ofthe Canadian National Railway system
reallocates income between interest and residual profits.
The wages and salaries component is the largest. It is basically de-
rived by extrapolationon theoperatingexpense series. Despite Green's
attempt to allow for differences in the relative importance of mainte-
nance ofway, the ratio ofwages and salaries is a virtual constant: .566
between 1890 and 1906 with a standard deviation ofonly .003. Yet the
actual ratio in the period 1907-13 is much more variable. The average
is .598 with a standard deviation of .038. Green's lapse is to overstate
the stability ofthe observed relationship and hence to exaggerate the
reliability of the annual variations. For trend purposes the order of
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magnitudes will clearly serve, but it is of course the annual income
originating that one wants.
An alternative procedure might be to start from operating expenses
and seek to estimate material purchases. Train mileage is available on
an annual basis and might serve as a measure ofdemand; some ofthe
price indexes for materials later used to deflate capital formation might
be of use. The advantage ofapproaching the problem from this other
side would be an independent estimate that could provide some indi-
cation ofthe likely range oferror.
The current income estimates are the easiest because ofthe annual
aggregates already available. The physical output and input measures
that occupy much of Green's efforts, and which are necessary for
calculation ofproductivity change, are harder to come by.
For output Green utilizes freight and passenger receipts deflated by
averagefares estimatedfrom rateschedules. Healsomighthave applied
a variant ofthe method he had earlier used for interest and dividends.
Byfocusing onthe largest lines, for which direct information was more
readily available, he might have narrowed the degree of estimation
considerably. Attheleast, suchanalternativecouldhave supplemented
the series on ton miles and passenger miles actually constructed. The
composite output series suffers from the defect of its weighting: the
absolutes (rather than relatives) seem to be weighted by current ratios
of freight and passenger revenues to total receipts. That yields an
inconsistent index. Because the long-term physical trends dominate,
the quantitative consequences over long intervals are not great. But
readers fortunately can construct their own output indexes, either
Paasche or Laspayres, because Green provides the necessary freight
and passenger rates.
More serious questions arise with regard to the labor input series.
Green derives his estimates by use ofa constant ratio ofemployees to
track mileage, but with an adjustment for a larger ratio during periods
ofconstruction. Once again, and even more so, he overstates the ad-
equacy of the relationship: the correlation between employment and
track in operation in the period 1907-19 when both are known is only
.49 and with an elasticity of .38. This is hardly testimony in favor of
"aremarkably stable ratio." Moreover, his variable adjustments seem
arbitrary: in 1892 he applies a factor of5; in 1893, 4.5; in 1894, 4. The
increments in track in operation are respectively 726, 441, and 622,
and estimated real investment is not very different either. It may have
been that with falling revenues in 1894, employment was reduced. On
the other hand, we are told that the Grand Trunk in 1891 and 1892
"had cut wages to the point where any further reductions would lead
to strikes, and it had laid off men," (Currie 1957, p. 363). Green's
employment cycle, and it is considerable, is apparently of his own
creation.814 Alan G. Green
For the estimation of labor input, other methods can be pursued.
For purposes of long-term trend, for example, one might begin with
the wage and salary series and deflate by an average annual wage to
derive an employment total. Average remuneration in manufactures is
available on a decennial basis from 1870 on. In 1910 the average railway
wage was about 17% larger. Assuming the same differential earlier
permits an estimatefor employmentin 1880, 1890, and 1900. The results
differ from Green's series by about 10% in the first 2 years, and in the
opposite direction. In 1890 employment was less than 60,000, and in
1880 more than 35,000. The implication is that productivity grew more
rapidly between 1880 and 1890, and less rapidly in the subsequent
decade, than Green's estimates suggest. For annual variation, the train
mileage series seems a betterindicatorofthe level ofemployment than
sheer track mileage: maintenance as well as operating requirements
are more dependent on intensity of use than extension. For the later
period, the relationship with train mileage is quite more regular; the
R2 is .67 compared with .24 for track mileage.
To the information on labor input, Green adds estimates offuel and
capital inputs in order to calculate total factor productivity. For the
former, Green uses the consumption per locomotive mile on the In-
tercolonial Railroad extended by the aggregate numberofengine miles.
Comparison with comparable United States estimates makes suspect
the 1900 value, and hence the calculations of productivity increase
between 1890-1900 and 1900-1910. One also would have liked some
attention to later variance among different lines: fuel use depended on
locomotive weight and size oftrains.
Because railroads are so capital intensive, the capital input is im-
portant. There are two problems. One is an estimate of the capital
stock; the other is an estimate of capital input in circumstances of
deliberate construction ahead of demand. Green relies on a gross in-
vestment series published elsewhere to construct a net capital stock
series. It is difficult to judge the validity of the procedures used to
derive real investment in the absence ofinformation in the proximate
source. It is obviously encouraging to see a rough correspondence
between rates ofchange ofthe capital stock series and ofthe mileage
and equipment series assembled byGreen. Butcautionis still indicated.
Crude trends are undoubtedly right, butthe purpose is finer calculation.
Nor do the stock series resolve the question of how to calculate
capital inputs. Excess capacity built into a system will underestimate
the efficiency with which current inputs are used, and overestimate
productivity increases associated with technological change. For some
purposes, one wants to single out the consequences of greater utili-
zation; to do so, one might recalculate the productivity index by as-
suming an actual constantcapitaVoutputratio and noting the difference.
Despite Green's later interest in the question ofconstruction ahead of815 Growth and Productivity in the Canadian Railway Sector, 1871-1926
demand and the increase in output after 1910, he does not do so. Had
he, he would have found that utilization of the excess capacity (so
measured) between 1900 and 1920 explains about one-fourth of the
recorded total productivity increase..
Green also might have related his calculated productivity results to
the trend decline in real freight rates. Then he would have noted that
real freight rates fell less than productivity increased in the 1890s (even
after allowance for changed labor and fuel inputs) but much more in
the decade between 1910 and 1920. In the former case, it opened op-
portunity for greaterreturn; in the latter, railways were being relatively
taxed.
This last finding is very much in the spirit ofGreen's revisionism of
the conventional story of Canadian railway nationalization during the
First World War: "The reason given for the government takeover was
that the supply of railroad services exceeded demand, forcing down
returns and creatingthe potentialfor bankruptcyand majordislocations
in the Canadian economy.... Was this really the case? The evidence
seems to suggest that the answer is no."
But Green may be overstating his case and misapplying the produc-
tivity results. There are three reasons.
First, the entire system was not nationalized. The Canadian Pacific,
paying handsome dividends, remained in private hands. Thus it is nec-
essary to disaggregate the physical performance ofCanadian railways.
When one does, it is clearthatthe earliercompletedlineofthe Canadian
Pacific was a prime contributorto the great increase in railroad freight
carriage rather than only the two new transcontinentals. Between 1910
and 1916 the number of bushels transported on the Canadian Pacific
increased from 113 million to 277 million, proportionately more rapidly
than the increase in total ton mileage (Innis 1971, p. 159).
Second, rates ofchange may be in the right direction without speak-
ing to absolute levels ofproductivity. Here Green starts out correctly
to compare the United States and Canadian levels but does not fully
follow through. Because Canadian transcontinental rates were influ-
enced by United States charges, the nexus is a critical one. Despite
lower levels ofproductivity, partially explained by lesser revenues per
mile of track and more frequent empty back hauls, Canadian freight
revenues per ton mile fell from 60% more than the American in 1890
to equality in 1910. That is an important part of the story ofeventual
nationalization. The duplication of facilities by constructing parallel
trackage as occurred after 1900 certainly did not help. Private gain
seemed to call for monopolizing through haulage on a single system,
but the systemic effect was overinvestment.
Third, productivity calculations are physical rather than financial.
Nationalization occurred because, despite extensive governmental as-
sistance, the Canadian Northern and the Grand Trunk Pacific coud not816 Alan G. Green
earn enough to meet even their fixed obligations. That is related to the
cost of construction and capitalization, as well as to the expenses of
operation. Green's point about regulation is obviously well taken.
Keeping rates low, as was done, meant losses. Butnote that rates were
also constrained by the competition ofthe profitable Canadian Pacific
and could not be set arbitrarily.
Green's challenge to conventional wisdom on the nationalization
issue thus is not decisive. His productivity calculations, particularly
extended to absolute comparisons with the United States and disag-
gregated, are an important and new element in the discussion. And he
is surely right to emphasize the developmental quality of Canadian
railway investment.
In sum, Alan Green has left us all in his debt by his efforts. These
new data, revised, extended, and used with care, permit new questions
to be posed and examined. He has himselfraised many, and in a fruitful
and challenging way. In the last analysis, the purpose of quantitative
research is not the numbers per se, but the substantive issues they
illuminate.
References
Abramovitz, Moses, and David, Paul. 1973. Reinterpreting economic
growth: Parables and realities. AmericanEconomicReview63 (May):
428-39.
Buckley, K. A. H. 1962. Capital formation in railway transport and
telegraphs in Canada, 1850 to 1930. Paper presented to the Canadian
Political Science Association Conference on Statistics, June.
Currie, A. W. 1957. The Grand Trunk Railway ofCanada. Toronto:
University ofToronto Press.
Easterbrook, W. T., and Aitken, Hugh. 1956. Canadian economic his-
tory. Toronto: Macmillan.
Fishlow, Albert. 1965. American railroads and the transformation of
the ante-bellum economy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
--. 1966. Productivity and technological change in the railroad
sector, 1840-1910. In Output, employment and productivity in the
United States after 1800, ed. Dorothy S. Brady. Studies in Income
and Wealth, vol. 30. New York: National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Fogel, R. W. 1964. Railroads and American economic growth. Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins Press.
George, Peter. 1968. Rates ofreturn in railway investment and impli-
cations for government subsidization of the Canadian Pacific Rail-
way. Canadian Journal ofEconomics 1 (November): 740-62.817 Growth and Productivity in the Canadian Railway Sector, 1871-1926
Green, Alan. The measurement ofnet income originating in the trans-
portation and public utilities sector. Mimeographed, Queen's Uni-
versity, Department of Economics.
Hood, W. C. and Scott, A. 1957. Output, labour and capital in the
Canadian economy. Report prepared by the Royal Commission on
Canada's Economic Prospects. Ottawa.
Innis, Harold A. 1923. A history ofthe Canadian Pacific Railway. To-
ronto: University ofToronto Press, reissued 1971.
Lithwick, N. H. 1967. Economic growth in Canada. Toronto: Univer-
sity ofToronto Press.
Marr, W. and Paterson, D. 1980. Canada: An economic history. To-
ronto: Macmillan.
Matthews; R. C. 0.; Feinstein, C. A.; and Odling-Smee, J. C. 1982.
British economic growth, 1856-1973. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Uni-
versity Press.
Plumptre, A. F. W. 1937. The nature ofeconomic development in the
British dominions. Canadian Journal of Economics and Political
Science 3 (November): 489-507.
Pomfret, R. 1981. The economic development of Canada. Toronto:
Methuen.
Statistics Canada. Fixed capitalflows and stocks, 1926-1978. Ottawa,
1978. Cat. 13-568.
Ulmer, M. J. 1960. Capitalin transportation, communications andpub-
lic utilities: Its formation andfinancing. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press (for NBER).
Urquhart, M. C., and Buckley, K. A. H. 1965. Historical statistics of
Canada. Toronto: Macmillan.